In 2020 Xin et al.proposed a new identity-based quantum signature based on Bell states scheme. By using a one-time padding (OTP) for both-side transfer operations like, "XOR", Hadamard H, and Y, they confirmed the security of the proposed scheme. However, after analyses, we found that the scheme cannot resist both the existing forgery attack and meaningful message attack. Therefore, we modified their scheme to include the required security, unforgeability, which is very important in quantum signature scheme.
Introduction
Signature scheme is a fundamental tool in the information security applied to the Internet in human daily life, such as, e-government, e-bank, e-commerce, etc. For coping with the upcoming quantum era, several quantum signature related articles have been proposed. There are two categories algorithms between them, i.e. the arbitrated algorithms [1, [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , where the verification is executed by a trusted third party, and the true signature schemes [3, 19] , in which the verification can be executed by anybody. In 2020 Xin et al. proposed a new identity-based quantum signature based on Bell states scheme [1] . They claimed that their scheme is more secure, practical, and efficient than the similar public-key quantum signature schemes. However, upon closer examination, we discovered that it does not support the security requirement of preventing signature forgery attack. We will demonstrate this in the article. To enhance its security, we will modify their scheme to include this feature. In addition, we also describe the enhancement in this content. The article is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce Xin et al.'s scheme. In Section 3, we analyze the weaknesses of the scheme. The modifications and the security issues are demonstrated and discussed in Section 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 6.
Review of Xin et al.'s scheme
In 2020 Xin et al.proposed a new identity-based quantum signature based on Bell states scheme. It consists of three roles: the signer, the verifier, and a trusted PKG; and four phases: initializing phase, key generation phase, signing phase and verification phase. They claimed that their scheme is more secure, practical, and efficient than the similar public-key quantum signature schemes. In this article, we only review the key generation phase, the signing phase, and verification phase to illustrate its weaknesses. As for the definitions of the used notations, please refer to the original article. We omit them here.
Key generation phase
In this phase, signer Alice sets her public key and obtains the private key from PKG, the phase is performed as follows:
(1) Alice chooses her identity = ( , , … , ) ∈ { 0, 1 } as her public key.
(2) PKG uses his master key G to calculate k= G ( ID ) to generate Alice's private key, where G: { 0,1 }*→{ 0, 1 } is an one-way function with uniform distribution. 
Signing phase
Signer Alice uses her private key k to generate signatures and encode messages, this phase is performed as follows:
(1) Alice encodes the message as a Bell state sequence | 〉 = ⊗ | 〉 according to the following rules: and stores {| 〉, , } as Alice's quantum signature.
Verifying phase
After receiving Alice's quantum signature, Bob and PKG perform the following steps to verifying it:
(1) According to random pad shared in advance, Alice calculates the OTP ciphertext = ⊕ , and then publicly announces . , and perform the intercept and resend attack on the quantum sequence |b〉, which B sends to PKG. Through the collected messages, Eve can launch both: (1) existential forgery, and (2) meaningful message attacks. We describe them below.
(1) Existential forgery attack In this attack, Bob wants to forge a message together with its corresponding | 〉, such that when PKG performs the reverse Pauli operations on | 〉 , and then decodes the result to obtain its message, he cannot detect anything wrong. We describe this attack as follows. (2) Meaningful message attack Eve first chooses a meaningful message , then, according to ⊕ , she finds the relevant to launch such an attack, so that ⊕ = ⊕ . Secondly, according to the difference (= ⊕ ), Eve computes the relevant = ⊕ . Also, she performs operations on the homologous photons according to the . For example: if = 010111 and = 110101, she will do the operation on the first and the fifth photons.
Modification
Due to the forgery attack their scheme suffers, in this section, we propose two types of improvements: (1) HMAC, and (2) decoy photons, on their scheme as follows.
(1) HMAC Since A and PKG had pre-shared a session key , this incurs that we can use the HMAC to make their scheme better. For example: When A sends out the sequences {| ′〉, , } to Bob, she also sends out the = ( , ). If concerning about its computational security in the upcoming quantum era, one can adopt an unconditional hash function [2] . Thus, if is modified in the way from Bob to PKG, PKG can detect Eve's illegal behavior by computing and compare the .
(2) Decoy photons Like the steps 4 through 6 done by Alice in the signing phase, when Bob sends out the quantum sequence | 〉 to PKG in step (3) of Section 2.3, Bob can add decoy photons into the quantum sequence | 〉, which is sent out to PKG, for checking Eve's illegal action to prevent such attack.
Security analysis
After the above modification, we can see that due to the one-way hash function property, from the the attacker cannot obtain Alice's secret k. Thus, cannot calculate the value of ( , ), which means that the message m cannot be changed. Hence, the forged message attack fails. Meanwhile, we can also add decoy photons to the quantum sequence transmitted by Bob to PKG, like the one done by Alice to Bob. By this way, PKG can detect whether or not there exists an attacker. That means if Eve launches the forgery attack on the quantum sequence | 〉 sent by Bob to PKG, he will be discovered. Therefore, both attacks on the original scheme have been thrawted away. Even if concerning about the computational security of the hash function in the upcoming quantum era, we can use the unconditional secure hash, as mentioned in the context of [2] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that Xin et al.'s identity-based quantum signature based on Bell states scheme has weaknesses. It suffers from Pauli matrix operation attack. We, therefore, modified it to avoid this hole. From the analyses shown in section 5, we confirm that we have promoted its security.
